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The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe
Hugh G. Henry

ince 1942 the Dieppe Raid has been the
subject of much controversy and debate
concerning its political and military background,
aims, plans, execution and supposed "lessons
learned." Although historians have documented
their arguments well, they have not examined
accurately or in any detail the operations of The
Calgary Regiment (Tank), 14 Canadian Army
Tank Regiment (14 CATR), Canadian Armoured
Corps. 1 Some misunderstandings and myths
concerning the tanks and men, their performance
and conditions affecting their actions, must be
dispelled. At this point it is worth noting that not
only was 14 CATR the first Canadian armoured
unit ever to go into action, it was the first time in
history tanks were used in an amphibious
landing, as well as the baptism of fire for the latest
British equipment, such as the Tank Landing
Craft (TLC), the new Churchill tank and its 6pounder gun.

S

In early 1941 The Calgary Regiment (Tank)
was mobilised as part of the newly formed 1
Canadian Army Tank Brigade (1 CATB) and after
only a few months of extremely basic training,
first with no vehicles or modem equipment and
later with Great War vintage, American
manufactured Renault tanks, the complete 1
CATB was sent overseas. It was to join the rest of
the Canadian Army Overseas which formed the
backbone of Great Britain's defence against the
expected German invasion. During the remainder
of the year, besides the normal training of driving
and maintenance oftanks, wireless instruction,
map-reading, range firing. reconnaissance and
tactical training were carried out. In the Spring
of 1942 several Canadian divisional and corps
anti-invasion exercises, code-named Beaver, were
carried out in the open country of Southern
England. During Beaver III, 14 CATR performed

the most satisfactorily of all armoured units and
therefore was chosen for the Dieppe operation.
In mid-May, 14 CATR moved to the Isle of
Wight and undertook two months of experimental
waterproofing of tanks that required much
improvisation and testing, and practised loading
and unloading tanks from the TLCs. Several
amphibious exercises and two rehearsals on June
11-12 and 22-23, code-named Yukon I and II, in
the area of West Bay and Bridport on the Dorset
coast, were carried out with engineers and
infantry of 2nd Canadian Division to give the tank
crews experience in supporting other ground units
assaulting a defended beach. Unfortunately none
of the beaches had towns fronting them or the
same stony beaches as at Dieppe. A typical
exercise began by securing a beachhead, then
moving a few miles inland over open country to
capture an objective, such as an airport, and
finally covering the withdrawal of the infantry to
the beach before the tanks re-embarked
themselves. The first exercise was a shambles,
due mostly to naval errors, resulting in many units
landing at the wrong beaches, late, or not at all.
The TLCs themselves were over an hour late. The
exercise showed the need for better liaison
between all arms, improved wireless
communication among all units, and more
effective smoke cover from air and sea. Yukon II
was more successful and therefore it was judged
suitable to proceed with the raid, although naval
units still had some navigational problems to
work out. During these exercises 14 CATR never
underwent street-fighting training with or without
infantry, in any villages or towns. In the middle of
August the regiment was ordered to prepare for
another amphibious assault scheme. All tanks,
vehicles, ammunition, and personnel were loaded
on the TLCs at Gosport and Newhaven by August
18, at which time the men were informed that
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Before-Above left: Tank training with chespaling. Beginning on 7 August 1942 at Seaford, Sussex, the
Beach Track Laying Device, which enabled a tank to climb a wall up to 28" high, was developed, tested and
approved a week later. For the raid thefirst tank on each of the six lead TLCs was to befitted with it. nvo
days before the operation,jive sets were completed and mounted while the sixth tank could not befitted as
it had ajlamethrower. During transportation to the coast two sets were damaged and were removed so that
only three tanks were so equipped for the raid. (Photo: Ed Bennett)
Above right: Tank landing exercise. During a June 1942 "Yukon" amphibious exercise, beach assault engineers
practised laying chespaling tracks to give 14 CATR tanks and other vehicles traction over beaches of any
composition. Of the 71 beach assault engineers who landed at Dieppe, only nine returned, of whom jour
were wounded. (NAC C138681)

the exercise would be an actual operation against
Dieppe.
The plan originated in early April 1942 at
Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQJ.
under the command of Vice-Admiral Lord Louis
Mountbatten. It was part of a series of raids
designed to gain experience in amphibious
operations, and test new techniques and material,
for the future invasion of the continent. At the
time, capturing a port in usable condition was a
fundamental and unchangeable determinate in all
invasion planning. COHQ planners chose Dieppe
in this context because they judged it had
adequate defences to test a divisional-size assault
while still being within the necessary range of
fighter cover. The operation, code-named Rutter,
originally scheduled for 20-21 June 1942, was
postponed several times in early July and was
indefinitely cancelled on 7 July due to
unfavourable weather conditions. 2 The decision
to revive the raid about a week later, redesignated
Jubilee, and the exact status ofits authorization
continues to be controversial. 3 A serious
deficiency in the plan was the cancellation of a
preliminary heavy naval and air bombardment
and the lack of heavy naval support artillery. 4

Instead, four Hunt class destroyers, with only 4. 7inch guns, were to briefly bombard, for about ten
minutes, the buildings and frontal installations
at Dieppe before switching their fire to the
headlands on either side of the town where the
Germans had emplaced heavy coastal guns.
Similarly, Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief
of the Air Staff, refused to risk losing bombers
needed for the strategic bombing of Germany. So
the heavy air bombardment component was
dropped. 5
An important consideration during the
planning was where to land the tanks. Since all
planners agreed that rivers had to be avoided,
the tanks could only land between the mouths of
the Scie and D'Arques rivers-this meant either
at the beach at Dieppe or a small part of the beach
at Pourville two miles to the west. In appreciation
of the outline plan for Jubilee by 2nd Canadian
Division, General Staff Officer 1, LieutenantColonel C. Churchill Mann naively pointed out
that tanks assaulting Dieppe could give immediate
fire support to the attacking infantry and
engineers and cause a psychological shock to the
Germans and civilian population. Ammunition
and engineer support material for tanks could
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be supplied more easily on the main beach where
the supply craft concentration point was. The
tanks would also be closer to their planned
objectives and the beach front was the most
convenient place for re-embarkation after the
raid.
Mann recognised the disadvantages of
attacking the enemy frontally, the need for
engineer assault teams, and the difficulty of
penetrating blocked streets due to bombardment,
but he pointed out that the garrison only consisted
of two low-grade infantry companies. Opting in
favour of the plan, he concluded that the tanks
would play an important part in the withdrawal
phase and that, in general, the tanks "seemed to
have a reasonable prospect ofsuccess."6
TI1e idea of sending a tank cavalry charge
through the narrow streets of an enemy defended
town, and out into the surrounding countryside,
holding a defensive perimeter and then
withdrawing through the town, all in the matter
of five and a half hours, was ridiculously foolhardy
and reckless. It also showed gross ignorance on

the part of COHQ planners and senior Allied
commanders of the capabilities and limitations
oftanks. 7 No one seems to have considered the
extreme vulnerability of tanks taking part in
street-fightingin built-up areas. Vision from a tank
is considerably impaired. If a crew commander
stuck his head out of the turret to get a clear view,
he was exposed to enemy sniper fire. Tanks could
neither protect themselves nor return fire unless
at some distance from the target because their
guns could not be elevated very high. Since they
depended on the infantry they also moved slowly.

The Assault Plan and Intelligence

T

he assault would be on a front of
approximately ten miles at five different
points. At 0450 hours precisely, after the short
naval bombardment and air attack by cannonequipped Hurricanes and Spitfires, the surprise
flank attacks would go in, followed half an hour
later by the main assault on the town. In all, 60
RAF squadrons were involved in the largest single
air battle of the war over the Dieppe area. 8

After-COUGAR, under command of 13 Troop Leader Thomas R. Cornett. successfully crossed the seawall at
the eastern end of the beach using its chespaUng device. Unable to adequately blow the wading extensions
and track-laying device, Cornett proceeded west. concentrating his 6-pounder fire on the tobacco factory.
While maneuvering, COUGAR broke its left track due to the build up of rocks between the front bogey wheel
and treads. The right track was soon blown by shelifire. The crew evacuated to the beach but not before
burning out the interior with a sticky bomb, supplied for just such a purpose.
(Bundesarchiv-MUitararchiv Freiburg RH 20-15!29)
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During the battle an accurately sited German anti -tank gun and crew lie in wait
near the end of the Rue de Sygognefor the possible penetration of any tanks.
(Bundesarchiv 611 12124-5)

On the flanks, Commam~tt-Jl would capture
and destroy the coastal batteries about five miles
east and west of Dieppe, while infantry were to
neutralise coastal batteries on the east and west
headlands which dominated the town. 9 The
Cameron Highlanders of Canada were to advance
to meet the tanks of"A" and "B" Squadrons, 14
CA1R, behind the town and then advance against
another coastal battery, an emergency fighter
airfield, and the local enemy divisional
headquarters thought to be atArques-la-Bataille.
These flank attacks were an essential requirement
for the success of the main frontal assault, half

an hour later, and to ensure the safety of the naval
support vessels. They were, in general, a failure.
The main attack was to capture the town and
hold it for a limited period while demolitions were
carried out. The beach was divided, the eastern
half (Red Beach) being invaded by the Essex
Scottish Regiment, commanded by LieutenantColonel Frederick K. Jasperson, while the western
half (White Beach) was attacked by the Royal
Hamilton Light Infantry, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert R. Labatt. Both
regiments were to be supported by 58 tanks of
14 CATR. commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
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Late in the battle, on 19 August, German reiriforcements climb over the metal gate blocking the Rue de
Sygogne. This metal gate would not have presented a problem to a 40-ton Churchill tank. Note the 7" high
and 4-5" wide reinforced concrete anti-tank walL These extended across all the streets to the promenade
with only a small gap to allow personnel to pass. They were surmounted by barbed wire and had a firing
step behindjor snipers. (Bundesarchiv 611/2122-16)

Johnny G. Andrews. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal and
"A" Commando of the Royal Marines were to be
held in reserve.
In planning Jubilee, COHQ relied on
imperfect intelligence. Sir F. H. Hinsley, the official
historian of British intelligence during the Second
World War, writes that COHQ planners were "overreliant on one source" of intelligence, photo
reconnaissance, and "took at face value"
intelligence that underestimated the strength of
the defences and the terrain. 10 Shots taken from
high elevations did not effectively show any
defences hidden by building roofs or caves blasted
into the cliffs of the headlands. 11
Given the limitations of photographic
intelligence, it is regrettable that intelligence
officers did not make a more careful evaluation
of known defensive positions from the perspective
of established German tactical doctrine. If COHQ
had used its knowledge of the enemy order of
battle and equipment in use, it could have made
a more realistic and detailed evaluation of the
defences on the beaches and in the cliffs. In actual
fact, Dieppe had been turned into a fortress. 12
The defences were sited in an "anti-raid" role as
opposed to an "anti-invasion" role meaning that

the majority of firepower was concentrated to
cover the beaches.
The garrison consisted of two battalions and
staff of the 571 Infantry Regiment amounting to
approximately 1,500 men. The east and west
headlands and cliffs contained numerous
positions ideal for defence. Artillery, machine-gun
nests, and dual-purpose flak-batteries were all
sited to bring enfilade fire on the beach, while
being cleverly hidden in depressions, caves and
camouflaged bunkers. Allied Intelligence and
COHQ planners underestimated the numbers and
calibre of many of these guns.
The defences in the town itself consisted of
37 mm and 47 mm anti-tank guns, French 75
mm beach defence guns and heavy machine-guns
hidden in buildings fronting the promenade. They
could fire directly into approaching landing craft.
The 1 ,500-yard promenade was interspersed with
concrete pillboxes siting similar weapons. Many
of these emplacements had connecting trenches
to open weapon pits from which German soldiers
could hurl grenades at the crouching troops
beside the seawall. Finally, the Germans had
mortars precisely ranged on the beach.
Lieutenant-Colonel Labatt in an after-action report
stated that, "stakes for ranging were still standing

65

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1995

5

Canadian Military History, Vol. 4 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 6

BERT was immobilized on the promenade when shell fire broke its left track . .lifter the battle it was repaired
by German engineers and is seen here towing CHIEF off the beach. Bundesarchiv 291 I 1242-2A

on the beach from a mortar practice carried out
the preVious day. Their fire plan was well laid out
and beautifully coordinated." 13

The Chert Beach, Engineers and
Tank Gadgetry
mqjor intelligence blunder was the failure to
identifY the exact composition of the beach at
Dieppe which proved to be the main technical
difficulty for the tanks. The whole beach is
composed of chert rocks which range from one
to six inches in diameter. Stan A Kanik, a former
trooper of"A" Squadron who was on the raid but
did not land, returned to Dieppe several times
after the war, most recently in 1992. Drawing on
his knowledge as a geological engineer his analysis
of the beach clearly explains why many tanks had
difficulty manoeuvring on the beach. He notes:
"the white cliffs are composed of siliceous chalk,
interspersed with chert lenses and beds." The
chalk is easily dissolved and leaves behind the
chert which under beach erosion is "shaped into
rounded and oblong stones (rocks) that resist
cracking or breaking." He continues, "The entire
beach is composed of chert stones, boulders

A

and rubble," which after tidal action, "eventually
rest at an "angle of repose" of about 15 to 20
degrees. Secondly, these rocks will extend many
meters in depth, so vehicles cannot dig down
to a solid rock base for traction. When a tracked
or wheeled vehicle tries to climb up this slope,
it immediately digs itself down; when the tracks
are turned to either side the stones roll in
between the drive sprocket and track and the
object that first gives way is the pins holding
the track links." 14
All regimental and standard histories
referring to Dieppe claim its beach is composed
of"shale" or "pebbles." The Allies had carried out
landing tests with the tanks on the firm, sandy
beaches of the Isle of Wight and on the small,
pebbly beaches of Dorset, but not on a chert
beach, such as found at Dover. The Germans, who
had many such trials, found their tanks became
bellied down and stuck and did not site any heavy
anti-tank guns or place anti-tank mines on the
beach in front of the town since they thought the
beaches were not negotiable by tanks.
COHQ planned for the Royal Canadian
Engineers (RCE) to aid the tanks in surmounting
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any obstacles. The RCE were divided into two
main groups-the Beach Assault Party (under
Major Bert Sucharov) and the Demolition Party
(under Lieutenant-Colonel L. F. Barnes) and then
subdivided into various sized detachments and
squads depending on their tasks and distributed
throughout the TLCs.
The Beach Assault Party was responsible for
getting all troops, stores, tanks and other vehicles
from the point of touchdown by the naval craft
onto, across, and clear of the beach area. This
meant clearing minefields, demolishing anti-tank
concrete road blocks at the exits of the promenade
and, using bulldozers to clear boulders, preparing
ramps for evacuation and generally keep the
beaches clear. If needed, these machines could
also aid vehicles stuck on the beach and push off
grounded landing craft. Ensuring that the tanks
crossed over the beach and the seawall were the
most important tasks of the Beach Assault Party.
The plan was to have four-man squads, carried
in the first six TLCs, run out ahead of the lead
tanks to lay chespaling tracks, which were flexible
rolls of chestnut fencing, "similar to wood-slat
snow fencing but made With tough split-slats."

The bundles weighed about 250 pounds, were
approximately 25 feet long and could be Wired
together to form a continuous track. These
tracks could be moved around by the engineers
to suit the later flights of incoming TLCs. 15 All
tanks, carriers and jeeps then passed over these
tracks, only becoming bogged down if they
swerved off them. Since many of the scout cars
had experienced difficulty during training even
on the chespaling, it was decided that during
the operation these should be towed ashore by
the tanks. Note that the pebbles on the Dorset
beach are small, up to two inches in diameter,
whereas at Dieppe they are up to six inches.
The seawall was estimated to be up to six
feet in height. The Rutter plan of using sappers
to blow gaps in the wall had been dropped in
favour of building timber crib ramps beside it
for the tanks to climb. Under favourable
conditions a highly trained detachment of thirty
engineers could carry the five tons of material
necessary thirty yards and build a ramp beside
a seven-foot wall in five minutes. 16 Due to the
intensity of German firing, no timbers were ever
unloaded.

BERT & CHIEF shown on the promenade. Four types qf Churchill tanks were used at Dieppe. The Mark I
had a cast turret holding a 2-pounder and .303 Besa machine gun, and a 3-inch howitzer in the hull; the
Mark II was the same except that a second Besa replaced the howitzer; the Mark II Oke was a Mark II with
the Ronson flamethrower apparatus added; the Mark III had a welded turret holding the newly-developed 6pounder gun, a Be sa positioned to the left of it, and a Besa in the hull. (Bundesarchiv 291 I 1242-6)
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Major Sucharov was assigned to develop a
device to enable the tanks to get over the seawall.
He came up with a carpet-laying device using
chespaling. He designed an apparatus to hold one
roll of chespaling, three feet wide (the width of
one track was twenty-two inches) and about
twenty-five to thirty feet long, in front of each track.
Controlled electrically from the turret, the ends
of the rolls could be released when the tank was
the appropriate distance from the seawall. The
rolls would then be gradually dragged under the
tank's tracks. The tank could then mount up to a
28-inch wall without problem. Mter use, the whole
apparatus could be jettisoned by an explosive
charge, electrically set off from inside the turret.
The device was demonstrated to LieutenantColonel Andrews and approved by him on 14
August. 17 Finally, the Beach Assault Party was
responsible for preparing for the successful reembarkation of all tanks and vehicles.
The Demolition Party was charged with
demolishing power stations, petrol dumps,
dockyard, dry-docks, swing bridges, gas works,
pumping stations, telephone exchanges and rail
facilities. The group was split up into many small
squads, each with its own commanding officer,
and assigned precise objectives to be sabotaged
once the infantry and tanks secured a perimeter
around the town. Most of these squads never got
off the beach. Indeed, the engineers had about
85 to 90 per cent casualties- the highest rate in
the raid. 18
The tanks themselves had been adapted for
amphibious operations up to a depth of six feet
using rubber balloon fabric. Tall, box-shaped
ducts (known as louvre extensions) were fitted to
the air intake vents and the exhaust pipes were
extended so as to be well above the water line.
The waterproofing and the louvre extensions
could be blown off by electrically-triggered cordite
charges placed underneath them. The
waterproofing procedure was still in the
experimental stage and had never been tested
under battle conditions.
These were the plans and preparations of
COHQ and the regiments involved. No contingency
plans for failure existed so success now depended
on the individuals of the assaulting force.

The Attack Begins
hirty minutes prior to the TLC's touchdown,
the tanks were to start warming up their
engines. Two types ofTLC were used and could
hold three or four tanks and one or two smaller
vehicles. Radio silence was maintained until zero
hour. The infantry were to land first, followed
immediately by the TLCs carrying the engineers
and tanks which would give immediate
supporting fire. Charles P. Stacey, the official
historian of the Canadian Army in the Second
World War, points out: "In any opposed landing,
the first minute or two after the craft touch down
are of crucial importance; and it may be said that
during that minute or two the Dieppe battle, on
the main beaches, was lost. The impetus of the
attack ebbed quickly away, and by the time the
tanks arrived the psychological moment was
past." 19

T

The first wave of tanks of 14 CATR arrived
about ten minutes late due to navigational error. 20
During this critical period, the infantry had no
fire support and the German defenders were able
to recover from the short preliminary air and
naval bombardment and man their weapons.
Thus, the assaulting infantry were caught trying
to blast gaps in the unexpectedly strong rows of
wire, the majority becoming pinned down at the
seawall, unable to dig slit trenches in the rocks.
The Essex Scottish tried three times to cross the
promenade but were repulsed each time with
heavy casualties. Thereafter, they could only
return fire from the limited protection of the
seawall. By about 0630 hours, only an hour or
so after landing, they had suffered at least 75 per
cent casualties.
On White Beach, the Royal Hamilton Light
Infantry were initially held up by the stronglyfortified Casino. Mter stiff fighting, they cleared
it despite many casualties. From the Casino they
gave covering fire to some small groups
attempting to penetrate the town. These units
engaged in minor house-to-house and street
fighting incidents with German patrols until they
started to run out of ammunition. When they
attempted to withdraw to the Casino, some were
taken prisoner in the process. The infantry,
initially pinned down behind the rows of barbed
wire and seawall, were only able to pass these
obstacles and later take the Casino after the first

68

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol4/iss1/6

8

Henry: The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe

flights of TLCs disembarked the supporting
engineers and tanks.
Flight 1 and lA consisted of six TLCs and
landed between approximately 0525 and 0535
hours, five to fifteen minutes late, carrying a total
of eighteen tanks. On touching down four of the
TLCs were heavily shelled, becoming so badly
damaged and killing the majority of the naval
crews, that one was sunk and three were unable

where one was immobilised by the chert. 21 The
remaining 12 tanks never got off the beach; four
had their tracks broken by shellfire, four by the
chert and three most likely by the chert, although
this is not certain. The last tank chose to stay on
the beach and was mobile for the duration of the
battle. 22 The tanks on the promenade drove back
and forth, unable to penetrate the town because
of the huge concrete road blocks, on which the
tanks' puny armour-piercing shells had no effect.

BEETLE was the last of three Churchill Mark II Oke flamethrower tanks of 8 Troop, "B" Squadron to exit
TLC-3, seen stranded in the background. Immediately after landing its right track broke while turning on
the rocks forcing it to act as a stationary pillbox until the surrender. Note the armoured flamethrower fuel
box at the back and the Ronson nozzle pointing up at the front. None of the flamethrowers were used during
the raid. (ECPA DAA 281-3L8)

to withdraw, becoming stranded on the beach.
Flight 2 of four TLCs carried a total of twelve tanks
and beached on schedule at 0605 hours. All tanks
disembarked except for one, unable to do so due
to the intensity of fire. Although only one TLC
was sunk, the others were so severely damaged
that they had to be towed back to England.
Of the 29 tanks that attempted to land, two
drowned and the rest made it to shore. Of these
27, 15 crossed the seawall, although 10 ultimately
returned to the beach in the area of the Casino,

The engineers and sappers had suffered
tremendous casualties and could not demolish
these concrete barriers. The remaining two flights
ofTLCs carrying the whole of"A" Squadron and
the remaining three troops of "C" Squadron, a
total of 28 tanks, were never sent in. The two
tank beach parties, instead of carrying out their
planned initial tasks of directing the tanks to their
objectives, spent most of their time in assisting
wounded and organising tank cover for the
general withdrawal.
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At 1100 hours, the senior tank officer
ashore, Major Allen Glenn, Officer Commanding
"C" Squadron, ordered all remaining mobile
tanks to withdraw to the beach and take up
defensive positions to cover the withdrawing
infantry. It seems that the Germans were
preparing for an infantry counterattack which
the tanks probably deterred. By noon all tanks
had been immobilised, 14 with broken tracks,
although many continued to fire until they ran
out of ammunition. All 14 CATR veterans and
Allied reports claim no tanks' armour was
penetrated by anti-tank fire while crews were
still in them, although German reports and a
photo, reveal that two were penetrated. 23 This
probably occurred after the crews evacuated
and the Germans moved their anti-tank guns
closer. Any casualties to 14 CATR personnel
occurred outside the tanks. Contemporary
reports that some tanks actually entered the
back streets of the town are false. 24 The crews
were ordered to evacuate at 1225 hours,
whereupon they destroyed their tanks with the
two "sticky bombs" provided for this purpose.
Some crews were unable to do so because the
blast would have endangered the many men
who were by now using the tanks as cover. At
1300 hours, about the time of general surrender
on Red and White beaches, General Roberts
sent out the code-word VANCOUVER, the signal
for the entire naval force to turn around and
head back to port. 25

Conclusion

T

he raid failed because the Jubilee Plan was
too inflexible, complicated and lacked
essential heavy bombardment from sea and air.
All units had precise objectives but there were no
contingency plans. Another serious fault was the
COHQ's neglect in using the air I ground
cooperation and support structure available to
it. The Army liaison officer attached to the Royal
Air Force headquarters, Lieutenant-Colonel
Charles Carrington, later wrote that there was
"nothing to be learned from Dieppe, except how
not to do it, a little late in the war to learn that
lesson. "26 This remark is also correct in reference
to the raid in general. Other obvious defects were
an over-reliance on tactical surprise, which was
not achieved, inadequate inter-service
communications and supporting naval fire, and

a lack of intelligence on the defences. 27 One
German report found it "astonishing" that the
strength of the defences were underestimated
since most of the details should have been obvious
from aerial reconnaissance photos. Also
surprising was the short duration expected to
carry the operation out and the inflexibility of the
plan. This report concluded that: "It is
inconceivable why they did not support the
battalions which landed near Pourville with tanks.
An attack with tanks from Pourville against the
hill west ofDieppe and against the "4 Ventes" Farm
might have been successful, although it would
have been most difficult to overcome the anti-tank
walls, the pier and the Scie [River] dam." 28
From the point of view of 14 CATR, the major
intelligence failure was not correctly identifying
the geological nature of Dieppe's chert beach,
which defeated at least six (probably nine) tanks,
in other words, one-third oftanks ashore. Major
Sucharov's beach track-laying device attached to
some of the lead tanks had not, as many
historians claim, been meant to aid the tanks over
this hazardous obstacle. This is obvious since
the length of chespaling carried was only slightly
longer than the tank itself, whereas the beach was
30 to 50 yards wide depending on the tide.
Instead, the device was designed to give a tank
traction at the moment of crossing the two-foothigh seawall. Two of the three tanks carrying this
device successfully used it as it was designed,
although COUGAR, 13 Troop "C" Squadron, had
problems jettisoning the apparatus which had
either been damaged by enemy shellfire or was
technically faulty. 29
The success of the experimental
waterproofing and deep wading attachments on
the tanks cannot be determined because almost
all the TLCs landed dry and many tanks received
damage to their exhaust and air intake louvres
and waterproofing before and while exiting the
TLCs, resulting in two drowning. Most of these
problems were caused either by the tanks
scraping against the sides of the TLCs or by enemy
fire. At least one tank, BULL, 8 Troop "B" the
Canadian War Museumthe Canadian War
Museum Squadron, had one of its louvres
knocked off before disembarking, probably by the
concussion of an exploding shell. 30 Some tank
crews were unable, or only partially able, to blow
the waterproofing and wading attachments,
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hydraulic or steering systems damaged by antitank and dive bomber hits. All these difficulties
were technical problems that could have been
foreseen with more testing, especially under
actual fire. (The necessary firing tests were
carried out after the operation.) The new 6pounder gun also jammed on many occasions,
even though it had been tested before the raid.
The guns were test fired with only five or six
rounds, due to the shortage of ammunition, and
at a low rate of fire. During the battle crews
obviously fired as quickly as possible. The high
rate of fire was concluded as the reason for the
jams and also revealed the tanks' normal
stowage of ammunition was insufficient for an
operation of this type. 33

Many high-ranking German officials and officers
came to inspect the aftermath of the raid. Near
Dieppe, Sepp Dietrich (left) and Albert Speer (right,
facing camera) examine captured Churchills and
observefiring tests. In the background is CAT, which
was disabled on the promenade by a hitfrom a JU-87
Stuka dive bomber.
(Bundesarchiv 291 I 1243-20

probably because the charges had been
damaged by enemy fire. A few crews even had
to manually cut this away, either because the
partially blown fabric had jammed their turret
traverse or obscured their vision ports. Proper
testing of this equipment under actual fire,
especially during disembarking training, would
have revealed its vulnerability. No arrangement
was made for shedding the exhaust
extensions. 31

A German military appreciation concerning
the Churchill tank in the operation, and intended
for internal distribution (as opposed to use for
propaganda purposes) started by saying that the
tank, "offers nothing worthy of consideration by
technical personnel, nor has it any new
constructive features either in the metallurgical
field or in the field of weapon technology."
Squadron Sergeant-Major Gerry M. Menzies, crew
commander of BERT, captured near where his tank
was disabled. Note the Casino. the west headland
and one of the many German slit trenches in the
background.
(Bundesarchiv Koblenz 611 12124-14)

The tanks were also severely undergunned.
Eleven of the tanks had 2-pounders, which were
like peashooters, while the other 18 had 6pounders (approximately 55 mm calibre).
Although the latter was the most modem British
gun, it was still obsolete when compared with the
German long-barrelled 75 mm turret gun in use
at the time. 32 The 6-pounder tanks did not even
have high explosive shells since they were still in
the development stage. Six-pounder turret jams
were caused by shellfire hitting the turret ring.
Some tanks had either their radio, electrical,
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Commenting on their armament, the 3-inch
howitzer and 2-pounder were considered
obsolete, while the 6-pounder performance did
not compare to the Russian equivalent. The
armour thickness was considered good but of
poor quality, compared to that used on German
and Russian vehicles. The shape of the tank was
considered outdated with the armour offering "a
considerable angle of impact." The report
concluded that the tracks were "made of very
brittle material" of"clumsy design" and "fractured
every time" they received a direct hit, which did
not occur with German and Russian tracks. On
testing the tanks it was found that the
considerable track noise definitely inhibited the
use of the wireless, to the point where the tanks
had to stop to be able to hear radio transmitted
speech. On the whole, the report gave the
Churchill a very low rating, finishing, "in its
present form, is easy to combat. "34
Concerning the other vehicles landed, at least
two scout cars were rammed by their towingtanks, probably because tank crews forgot about
them in the excitement of battle and confusion
caused by the unexpected fierce enemy resistance.
Four others were towed ashore as planned but
then became bogged down or were hit by shellfire. One did make the promenade but, on
returning to the beach, was disabled by a mortar
bomb. Only one universal carrier and one jeep
landed, both not moving off the beach. None of
the bulldozers landed, although one was left in
the back of the stranded TLC-3. 35
Although most of the technical problems of
the tanks and other vehicles could have been
avoided through more realistic testing and
training, under simulated battle conditions using
live ammunition, (14 CATR had less than two
months of amphibious assault training before the
raid), it probably would not have made much
difference to the overall outcome of the battle.
The objectives and orders of 14 CATR in the
raid showed the shattering ineptness of COHQ's
tactical planning and the inadequacy of Allied
armoured doctrine at this stage in the war. The
futile decision to send tanks into a heavily fortified
town was based on the outdated armoured tactics
of the Great War.

To have planned a tank attack across a
chert beach without trial on a similar beach,
such as available at Dover, is, in afterthought,
incomprehensible. Additionally, the idea of using
tanks, with their very limited gun elevation and
visual capabilities, to fight through a major
built-up area, without considerable support,
indicates gross ignorance or deliberate
overlooking of the operational limitations of
tanks. Only one sniper's bullet is necessary to
kill a crew commander who tries to improve
vision by putting his head outside the turret.
The plan is astonishing when it is recalled
that 14 CATR had been trained for infantry
support either in the open countryside or on the
sandy beaches ofthe Isle ofWight. The regiment
never had any training in the complex and
dangerous type of close-quarter house-to-house
fighting, necessitating extremely close infantry
cooperation, that it would have encountered if its
tanks had been able to penetrate the narrow
streets.
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing
comments, it is fitting to pay tribute to the
courageous action of the Calgary Regiment's tank
crews in providing covering fire to help the few
infantry and other survivors to evacuate Dieppe
beach. This effort explains why all except three
of the men were taken prisoner. These valiant men
fought until all their ammunition had been used
up, by which time they had to choose between
death, if they left the shelter of their tanks, or
imprisonment if they stayed inside their tanks
until taken prisoner. It was a painful yet obvious
choice and a sad ending to one of the worst defeats
in Canadian military history.
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